The Gruter Institute Working Papers on Law, Economics, and
Evolutionary Biology
Volume 4

Article 1

2006

Intellectual Property and Competition – Human
Economic Universals
Wolfgang Fikentscher
University of Munich, Faculty of Law, rechtsanthropologielmu@yahoo.de

Follow this and additional works at: http://services.bepress.com/giwp
Recommended Citation
Fikentscher, Wolfgang (2006) "Intellectual Property and Competition – Human Economic Universals," The Gruter Institute Working
Papers on Law, Economics, and Evolutionary Biology: Vol. 4, Article 1.
Available at: http://services.bepress.com/giwp/vol4/iss1/art1

Copyright © 2006 by the authors. All rights reserved.

Intellectual Property and Competition – Human Economic Universals
Abstract
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intellectual property, and competition for the acquisition of such property, are innate building blocks of
human behavior “deep in our brain” and inherited characteristics of our human nature, or whether they are
cultural attitudes and abilities which we have to learn because we are not born with it. In the first case we
would call them human universals, in the second cultural specificities. Also, a way has to be shown how we can
know the one or the other.
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I. The Status of the Issue in the Social Sciences
My contribution to this workshop is an approach to answering the question whether property,
in particular intellectual property, and competition for the acquisition of such property, are
innate building blocks of human behavior “deep in our brain” and inherited characteristics of
our human nature, or whether they are cultural attitudes and abilities which we have to learn
because we are not born with it. In the first case we would call them human universals, in the
second cultural specificities. Also, a way has to be shown how we can know the one or the
other.
Can intellectual property and competition be both, universals and cultural specificities?
Maybe, if there are, in the human brain, programmed predispositions to have and possess a
thing, and later in the course of human life a concrete shape is given to certain forms of
property, and competitive behavior to gain and hold such property, our answer could be: both.
Still, if we would come to this result, we would implicitly have said yes to at least some
universals of doing business among humans.
The field which we enter when we discuss these issues is so broad that it is impossible to
cover all aspects involved. All the more some words are in order to pin down the status of the
issue as it will be discussed here in the total framework of the social sciences, because a
number of possible accentuations are on offer. The approach chosen here is not psychological,
nor sociological, nor sociopolitical. It uses of the tools of micro-economical and legal
empirical anthropology.
Empirical anthropology (as opposed to unempiricical philosophical anthropology) is a social
science to be divided into cultural and biological anthropology. Both these branches try to
research and define the conditions of the human being in a comparative way, and in their

mutual interdependence. 1 Regarding the subjects of this paper: intellectual property and
competition, the biological branch will research possible innate predispositions, and the
cultural branch the various cultural shapes which intellectual property and competition may
take in legal-economical reality.
Our chosen micro-economical and legal approach forces upon us to decide a preceding issue:
(1) are there economic laws and other generalities that are valid in all cultures, and which
therefore have to be observed first, such as the laws of supply and demand, limited resources,
unlimited needs, rational decision, utility maximizing, marginal utility, cost, perfect
competition and market, property rights, and acting under risk and uncertainty, before there
can be a cultural specification; or, (2) do we first have to ascertain the cultural variations of
doing business (including the handling of intellectual property and competition) before there
can be talk of economic and legal generalities.
This is the form in which the search for universals presents itself in economy and law. Only
when we have decided this issue we are allowed to further investigate whether intellectual
property and competition are human universals. The issue, just formulated, is the
methodological main topic in economic anthropology. 2 In this debate, the first position, the
one that starts from transcultural economic generalities (such as the doctrine of marginal
utility) and applies cultural variations in the second place, received the name “formalism”. 3
The second position, the one that starts from the wealth of cultural variations and cautiously
asks for common points of view and points of contact for comparisons, is called
“substantivism”. 4
As remarked before, we have to opt for one or the other doctrine before we can go on.
1

W. Fikentscher, Law and Anthropology, Reader Law 265.7 & LS 190, University of
California School of Law at Berkeley, Spring 2000, 2; cf., idem, Modes of Thought, 2d ed.
Tübingen 2004, 77, 91.
2

Martin Rössler (1995, 2005); Jochen Schumann (1992).

Chief protagonists: Raymond Firth (1952; 1967); Melville Herskovits (1952); H. K.
Schneider (1974).
3

4

Chief protagonists: Bronislaw Malinowski (1920; 1922); Karl Polanyi (1957); George
Dalton (1961; 1965); Marshall Sahlins (1969; 1974). Why the opposing doctrines received
these labels cannot be discussed here, see, e.g., Rössler (2005), 33 ff.

I.

A Substantivist Perspective, the Two Determinisms, the Role of Empiricism,
and a Farewell to Neoclassics
1. The Formalist Argument

The strength of the formalists’ argument rests upon the success of neoclassic economic theory
which in the years after 1870, based on the writings of Gossen (1854), W. S. Jevons, L.
Walras , C. Menger, A. Marshall, F. Y. Edgeworth, J. B. Clark, V. Pareto) etc., turned
classical economics ( Adam Smith (1776), David Ricardo (1817), Th. R. Malthus, N. W.
Senior, J. Mill, J. St. Mill, J. B. Say, etc.), a theory that tried to explain observed economic
behavior, into a science that postulated economic behavior under certain fixed theoretical
requirements. 5 Such requirements came to be marginal utility, rational choice, perfect
competition, perfect market, property rights, and the other beforementioned “generalities”. 6
The formalist camp finds the neoclassic economic concepts and laws to be so strong and
convincing that they are valid for preindustrial and industrial peoples alike. Raymond Firth
and Melville Herskovits took the lead of the formalist group. 7 The leading German economic
ethnologist Martin Rössler shares the formalist view because “economy follows always and
everywhere certain inherent patterns of regularity”. 8

5

Rössler (2005), 34 ff.; Gregory (1982; 1997); Appadurai 1986; H. K. Schneider (1974).

This change of paradigms is also called the „marginalistic revolution“, for details see, e. g.,
Blaug 1985, Boland 1985, Rössler (2005), 35 – 45, 128 – 131.
6

7

See note 3, above.

8

at 131: „Wirtschaft folgt immer und überall bestimmten Gesetzmäßigkeiten“.

However, also Rössler stresses the frequent shortcomings of neoclassic economic theory to do
justice to the economic specificities of many preindustrial ethnic groups. 9 Nonetheless,
Rössler holds the basic ideas and laws of neoclassicism in principle applicable to all
economies in the world.

2. The Substantivist Answer
The substantivists point to the many forms of economic behavior which, under the terms of
Western economic science, can only be labeled irrational, such as potlatch give-aways, or
circular gift-giving in the Kula style. 10 To quote merely one voice: “Western economists
assume that scarcety is universal, which it isn’t, and that in making choices, individuals try to
maximize personal profit. However, in non-industrial societies, as in our own, people
maximize values other than individual profit. Furthermore, people often lack free choice in
allocating their resources”. 11
It might be added that also the other neoclassic tenets show significant flaws when applied to
the wealth of economic realty, even beyond the doubts Rössler is mentioning himself: The
laws of supply and demand do not work in moneyless societies. As Kottak remarks, resources
are often unlimited. Needs, always unlimited in neoclassics, are often limited. Rational
decisions are lacking in ceremonial exchanges. In turn, utility maximizing and the concept of
marginal utility often yield to seeming irrationality. Cost calculation is missing whenever
ideologies prevail. Perfect competition and perfect market exclude rivalry and are therefore
opposites of competition and market. 12 Property rights may take very different shapes and

9

e. g., at 37 f., 42 ff., 67 f., 72, 76 f., 95, 101, 159 f., 165 f., 171, 179 ff., 230.

10

B. Malinowski, Kula: The Circulating Exchange of Valuables in the Archipelagoes of
Eastern New Guinea, 20 Man 97 – 105 (1920)
C. Ph. Kottak, 4th ed. 1987, 144. For other substantivists, see note 4, above. My own
position in Culture, Law and Economics, Berne & Durham 2004, is substantivist , without
giving detailed reasons. For literary attempts – none of them having seemingly been
convincing - at bridging the opposing views, see, e. .g., Rössler (2005), 128 - 131.
11

12

W. Fikentscher , Culture, Law and Economics (2004), 119 – 178.

lack a coherent theory of cost and participation. 13 Acting under risk and uncertainty is just as
culture-specific as, for example, societal structures. 14

3. Two Determinisms Conflicting
The main incongruency between economic neoclassics and economic ethnology consists,
however, in the clash of two determinisms: Neoclassic economy does not aim at explaining
observations of economic occurrences, but at establishing a model for a given economic
behavior, namely, rational, utility maximizing, cost conscious, etc. 15 Thus, neoclassics
deductively and normatively postulate correct acting of homo oeconomicus in accordance
with economic generalities . Neoclassics are not relevant for reality, and defy empiricism. 16
Economic ethnology, on the other hand, is determined culturally by observable economic
behavioral specificities, and has no raison d’être but empiricism. These two determinisms run
against one another, and meeting half-way miss each other. This may be a reason why
conciliatory theories are so difficult to find.

4. A Medieval Dispute
Which determinism will bear the palm, the economic or the ethnological? The decision seems
to depend on the role to be assigned to empiricism. There is a debate on generalities and
specifities, dating back to the 12 th, 14th and 15th century, the famous medieval debate on
universalia. The issue of this debate was whether universal concepts such as grace, sin, spirit,
family, people, property, etc., contain a thing that in reality exists, or whether universal
concepts represent no real life but are just names, designations, for summed up bits and
pieces, specificities so to speak. The first position was called universalism, the second
nominalism. Since the Church believed in, and taught, concepts of universal nature,
See, e.g., Rössler (2005), 97 f. on the one hand, and W. Fikentscher, Culture, Law and
Econimics (2004), 37, 185, on the other.
13

14

W. Fikentscher, Modes of Thought (2004), 183, and at the different modes of thought.

15

Rössler (2005), at 36 f., 39, 71. Obviously, globalization seems to support neoclassics.

16

Rössler (2005), 37 f.

universalism was methodologically convenient for its work, whereas nominalism sometimes
got the smell of criticizing religious dogma. 17
Famous universalists, also called realists, are William of Champeaux and Duns Scotus. In
essence, they adhered to the Platonic conception of ideas, existing in reality, and to be learned
and known by human investigation and dialog, detached from the ideas themselves, a
conception introduced into Christianity by St. Augustin (universale ante re). The empirical
element of this line of thought consists in the admonition to check and judge the truth of the
existing ideas.
The most renowned nominalist is William Ockham, a skeptic of realiter existing universals,
and as such an empiricist (universale post rem).
Abélard and Thomas Aquinas developed a mediatory theory holding that universals exist but
only to the degree the investigator decides what he or she wants to know, and the act of
identifying the contents of the concept not to be detached from the universal to be known
(universale in re). This third, mediatory, theory carries Aristotelian entelechia, inherent
purposefulness, into the knowing of universals and is thus in conformity with other Thomist
thinking. But it is not empirical. 18 After pre-Socratic theory of judgment, Socratic belief in the
existence of ideas, and Platonic dialog as a means of interpersonal probing ideas with the aim
of assertion and acceptance, Aristotelian entelechia was an animistic atavism harking back to
pre-axial-age belief in soul-and-meaning carrying things. It became of historical importance
that both Islam and Thomism learned from Aristotle, not from Parmenides and Plato.
5. Empiricism
Thus, the background to the three theories of the medieval universalia debate is the degree of
permission to empirically check truth. The medieval philosophers, when dealing with the
universalia problem, were looking out for freedom of judgment founded on empirical
research. Therefore, a historical argument leads to the result that in view of the two
In recent times, the universalia debate has regained philosophical importance in connection
with issues such as rationalism, skepticism, empiricism, and relativism, see W. Stegmüller,
Glauben, Wissen und Erkennen: Das Universalienproblem einst und jetzt, 1965, 1974.
17

Cf., W. Fikentscher, Methoden des Rechts, I 365 ff., 404 ff.; II 413; III 8, 10, 331; IV 454,
485.
18

conflicting determinisms empiricism, and thus the ethnological - cultural - determinism wins
over the economical one. This facilitates the question for modern universals: Starting point is
ethnological empiricism, human universals have to be gained by induction. They are not
preconceived generalities. Hence, the issue whether property and competition are human
universals or cultural specificities should be tackled from the empirical ethnological side.
Therefore, the next question can be asked: How do we empirically ascertain human
universals? And more precisely in our context: Are tangible and intellectual property among
them?
6. Where Neoclassic Economics Fail
It cannot be denied that the empirical approach to a decision between universals and
specificities taken in the above text raises a serious conflict with neoclassic economics. It is
not only empiricism as being the hub of the medieval dispute about knowing things that
demands us to follow the empirical path. These medieval controversies lie way behind now-adays’ issues of philosophy and the humanities. They are certainly far away from modern
theories of economics and hardly mentioned at all when there is talk of epistemological
alternatives.
Yet, empiricism is a backbone of modern epistemonology as much as it was since the musings
of pre-socratic philosophers. Parmenides’ teachings got hold of what today is called Western
(Greek-Judaic-Christian) thinking: that here is a subject, and out there an object, and that both
are connected by a third to be called thinking. It is to that subject that is given the chance to
make a judgment based on reasoning: “this is true because…..”, “this should be so
because…..”, or “this beautiful because…..” The truth-related, the moral, and the esthetic
judgment are the three propositions a human being can render, and everyone of these three
judgments requires critical observation that precedes the reasoned judgment. This three-step
process subject – thinking – object implies an activity of checking, finding out, probing –
always against a background of doubt -, and it is called empiricism. Empiricism is an
indispensible corollary of science, also of the science of economics.
The opposite of empiricism is the deduction from preconceived models, from ideal states.
Now, two pairs of distinction should not be confused: There is universalism v. nominalism, to

be distinguished by belief or disbelief in he existence of general concepts. Second, there is
empiricism v. deduction from models, to be distinguished by inductive concluding from
observations or deductive applications of models. Thus, defensible are the following
positions: empirical nominalism, model nominalism, empirical universalism, and model
universalism. The approach chosen in this paper is empirical universalism.
The early modern economists were empiricists. Adam Smith, David Ricardo and the other
theorists mentioned above, II., 1., observed economic facts and drew their conclusions from
such observations. The marginalist revolution (see again II 1.) contributed to defining ideal
economic states (perfect competition, perfect market, marginal utility, homo oeconomicus,
utility maximizing, “antitrust more economic approach”, non-time-related efficiency, etc.) and
compared economic reality with them. Marginalism became a center piece of neoclassic
economics. Economics became a postulative theoretical program. Empiricism did not
disappear at all, but was degraded to an instrument for proving that reality did not meet the
predefined model standards. This methodological syncretism mixes two incompatible
standards: inductive conclusion based on empirical observation against deductive derivation
from non-empirical prescript.
This is not the place to repeat the long list of shortcomings of neoclassic economics : noncompetitive concepts of market, submarkets, and of competition itself; assumptions of market
anonymity, misjudgment of market shares and their proof; misguided theory of socalled
market failures; mistaking potential competition and contestable markets; misjudgment of
substitutability, of “adverse selection”, and of appreciability of monopolies and less incisive
restraints of competition; disregard of the factor time; unclear role of property, of intellectual
property protection, and of private claims in market law; general unusability for national and
international antitrust (including world trade) evaluations and policies (such as the
relationship between “competition” and “trade” in WTO and ICN), deregulation, consumer,
small business, and fair trade policies); mistaking the protection of free and fair competition
as “paradoxical”; inability to explain the role of collective goods in a free economy; and of
the working of rules of conflicts of law in competition law including attendant comparative
law and culture comparison. 19

Details in W. Fikentscher, Culture, Law and Economics (2004), 134 ff.; idem, Markt oder
Wettbewerb oder beides?, GRUR International 2004/9 (Festschrift Rudolf Krasser), 727 –
731.
19

There is at least one more reason why neoclassic economy meets a difficulty when exposed to
the demands of practice-oriented economic theory and policy. The difficulty follows from
economic needs and practices in less favored nations such as developing countries and
countries which border at economically strong neighbors. Examples are Nigeria’s problems
with big oil corporations, Indian reservations whose peoples’ traditions and skills are
exploited by outside businesses, Ukraine’s dependence on Russian natural gas, and Canada’s
general economic dependence on US. The legal protection of such economically weaker
partners poses well-known issues. In the areas of intellectual property protection and unfair
trade practices, it has been proposed to let the plaintiffs of the weaker economies resort to
their own local courts which, jurisdiction assumed, apply their own laws and legal principles
and ideas, and let the successful plaintiffs try to get titles of execution granted by the courts
of the more powerful nations.20 There is no reason why this local-court-and-local-law
approach should not work in antitrust matters in the same manner. Of course, the defendants
in the economically stronger countries will ask their courts to block transborder execution by
invoking public policy (lack of mutuality will not work). But it is a well-confirmed
observation that courts are reluctant to rely on the public policy (or ordre public) defense
against transborder executions when general concepts and values of law are involved, like
property, free and fair competition, trust, reliance on a given promise, equal treatment under
the law, non-discrimination, due process, etc. This reluctance gets even stiffer when these
concepts and values have been recognized in international instrumen ts such as the UN
Charter, the Human Rights Declaration, WTO, or TRIPS.21 Law’s efficiency lies in its
decentralization.
What makes these transborder effects of local legal protection so convincing is the general
idea of law behind the claim in question. Reaping where one has not sewn, or abusive
monopolistic behavior, are practices that meet disapproval in many jurisdictions, Nigeria,
20

W. Fikentscher, Geistiges Gemeineigentum – am Beispiel der Afrikanischen Philosophie,
in: Ansgar Ohly et al. (eds.), Perspektiven des geistigen Eigentums und Wettbewerbsrechts,
Festschrift Gerhard Schricker zum 70. Geburtstag, Munich 2005: C. H. Beck, 3 – 18.
Examples used in this article are taken from African tribes, Australian aborigines, Zuni
Pueblo, NM, and the Hopi Nation.
21

A recent example of such reluctance: OLG Naumburg of Feb. 9, 2006, WuW 2006, 932 –
936, where service of a US American antitrust class action for treble damages was granted in
Germany and the public policy defense raised against it by German defendants was dismissed
although German law does neither know class actions in comparable cases, nor treble
damages at all..

Zuni, Hopi, Ukraine, Canada, and elsewhere. Thus, protection granted such behavior is based
on universals. These universals are ideas the existence of which is assumed, and the
assumption is based on empirical observation.
Parmenides’ judgments and Plato’s dialogical investigations are models of the
epistemological methods being used for what may be called empirical universalism. No
deductions from models occur. The empiricism of this universalism forbids the neoclassic
approach. To solve the issues discussed, neoclassic economics must fail. To apply the localcourts approach, centralized law is just as dispensible as identical concepts of person, market,
competition, contract, property (private or collective, tangible or intangible), cost, utility,
institution, etc. This means, neoclassic concepts are not needed to establish ethnographic
economics. They are even in the way of its establishment. One does not have to strive for the
same economic concepts and evaluations in the different economies and the legal systems
protecting them. It is enough that local courts decide according to local law and the other
jurisdictions concerned do not accept the public policy defense because the legal policies
pursued are similar. This makes commons (Allmenden) protectible in legal systems which do
not know commons. This makes the droit moral to tribal secrets protectible in legal systems
that have neither tribes nor secrets.
Neoclassic economic theory has its great merits in making many economic decisions more
predictable, even calculable. But for modern, national and global, politico-economical
statements, antitrust and unfair competition policies, discussions about economic justice,
globalization issues, and consulting, it is time to say a farewell to neoclassics. At least in these
areas, economic theory should return to empiricism and comparative concept-forming and
evaluations. An Empirical Economic Theory fits our time better. For ethnoeconomics,
substantivism is just a consequence. 22
The empirical element of this theory may lead to the ascertainment of universals. As shown,
they may be the result of comparison. How can universals be determined?
22

One need not share radical tribal revivalism (e.g., Peters 2006; Lundberg 2006) to see that
one day intertribal justice and trust may in part assume the role state sovereignty has played,
since Hugo Grotius installed the sovereign nations, linked in trust (fides) to each other, in the
place the Roman Empire held since Caesar’s times, cf., W. Fikentscher, De fide et perfidia,
Der Treuegedanke in den "Staatsparallelen" des Hugo Grotius aus heutiger Sicht,
Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-Hist. Klasse, Heft 1,
München 1978: (Kommission C.H. Beck), 56 – 64.

III.

Universals – What Are They?

1. The Phenomenon. Archetypes. Natural Constants. Universals defined. Islam.
Metaconcepts and -values as Anthropological-analytical Universals

According to Donald E. Brown (who wrote the modern standard book on ethnological
universals) a definition of universals to begin with, subject to future refinement, is:
“….. a trait or complex present in all individuals (or all individuals of a particular sex and age
range) , all societies, all cultures, or all languages – provided that the trait or complex is not
too obviously anatomical or physiological or too remote from the higher mental functions”. 23
Examples are aggression and aggression control, reciprocity, etiquette, folklore, obstetrics,
cosmology, courtship, incest taboos, residence rules, joking, and mourning. 24

cultural trait = singular attribute of a given culture, such as the British “bobby”, Bavarian
Lederhosen, or Finnish sauna; complex = sum of cultural traits forming an assembly which
is characteristical for a given culture such as the the Indian powwow, the Irish pub, or the
Munich Oktoberfest.
23

.

Donald E. Brown, Human Universals, Philadelphia 1991: Temple University Press.
Here follows an incomplete list of anthropological publications on cultural universals: Clyde
Kluckhohn, Universal Categories of Culture, in: Anthropology Today: An Encyclopedic
Inventory, Chicago 1953: Chicago U. Press, 507 - 523; idem, Common Humanity and
Diverse Cultures, in: Daniel Lerner (ed.), The Human Meaning of the Social Sciences, New
York 1959: Meridian, 254 – 284; Charles F. Hockett, The Problem of Universals in
Language, in : Joseph H. Greenberg, Universals of Language, Cambridge, Mass. 1963: MIT
Press, 1 – 22; Joseph H. Greenberg, Language Universals: With Special Reference to Feature
Hierarchies, The Hague 1966: Mouton; I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Die Biologie des menschlichen
Verhaltens, Munich 1984: Piper (5th ed. 2004); I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Wulf Schiefenhövel &
Volker Heeschen, Kommunikation bei den Eipo: Eine humanethologische
Bestandsaufnahme, Berlin 1989: Reimer; Carol R. Ember & Melvin Ember, Cultural
Anthropology, New York 1973: Appleton-Century-Crofts; Robin J. Fox, The Red Lamp of
Incest, New York 1980: Dutton; Ralph Linton, Universal Ethical Principles: An
Anthropological View, in: Ruth Nanda Anshon (ed.), Moral Principles of Action: Man’s
24

In his foreword, Donald E. Brown declares his book to be directed against the – in his view –
dominant anthropological tradition of cultural relativism, to be blamed on Franz Boas and his
school, represented, for instance, by Ruth Benedict’s book “Patterns of Culture” (1934). 25 It
was Boas (1858 – 1942) who rejected both anthropological evolutionism and the
functionalism of British social anthropology on the ground that all cultures exist in their own
right and without serving purposes. Driven to an extreme, this view can be misunderstood as a
vote against any cultural comparison and connection of one culture with another. Brown may
have misunderstood Boas and his school in this way as extremely culturally “relativistic”.
However, Boas would not have denied that cultures can be compared, and that any
comparison contains a tertium comparationis as a common point of reference, and thus of
universality, if to a less-than-worldwide extent. 26
The antonym to ethnological universal is, when we follow Brown, a trait or complex not
present in all cultures but specific to certain cultures or to only one culture. Thus, the question
raised by any search for human universals is whether a cultural trait or a complex has general
importance for more than one culture, or whether it is – in its actual appearance - a specificity
for a given culture.
Thus, we cannot speak of a universal only when we find a trait or complex in all the 10.000
cultures that are said to have existed in history and to exist in the presence. It ought to be
Ethical Imperative, New, York 1952: Harper, 645 – 669; Barbara Lloyd & John Gay (eds.),
Universals of Human Thought: Some African Evidence, Cambridge 1981: Cambridge U.
Press; Laura Nader & June Starr, Is Equity Universal?, in : Ralph A. Newman (ed.), Equity in
the World’s Legal Systems: A Comparative Study, Brussels 1973: Bruylant, 125 – 137;
Lionel Tiger & Robin Fox, The Imperial Animal, New York 1971: Holt, Rinehart & Winston;
John Tooby & Lea Cosmides, The Innate versus the Manifest: How Universal Does Universal
Have To Be? 12 Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 – 37 (1989); Charles E. Osgood, William
H. May & Murray S. Myron, Cross-Cultural Universals of Affective Meaning, Urbana 1975:
U. of Illinois Press; Terence E. Hays (vol. ed.), Encyclopedia of World Cultures, vol. 2,
Oceania, Ney York 1999: Macmillan; U. Segerstråle & P. Molnár, Non-verbal
Communication: Where Nature Meets Culture, Mahwah, NJ 1997: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates., Publishers.
25

at vii.

Extreme cultural relativists who hold that no conceptional or evaluative way can lead from
one culture to another, are hard to find. M. J. Herskovits is sometime quoted to this effect, but
Brown (at 68 and 71) himself calls Herskovits an author who insists on the existence of
certain cross-cultural commonalities.
26

enough to find a trait or complex in a high number of cultures, such as the trait mourning on
the occasion of the death of a close person, and the complex of liminality (A. van Gennep, V.
Turner) that divides practically every society in age groups such as newly born, toddler,
infant, adolescent, etc. A universal is a trait or complex which is empirically found in so many
cultures that there is a presumption that it may be found in other cultures, too.
This implies that there are exceptional cultures in which we do not find a trait or complex that
we expect to find there from having seen other cultures. Thus, in all island and coastal
populations we expect to find the complex of seafaring. However, there was a polynesian king
who lost his son at sea. The king forbade his people any use of boats and navigation, a
command that caused near starvation. The cultural complex of seafaring was missing, but this
does not affect the universal character of seafaring among coastal and island populations. It
may occur that a singular trait or complex is missing not only in a single culture, but that a
whole group of cultures lacks a spesific trait or complex. This may happen when a mode of
thought that defines and shapes that group of cultures prevents the existence of that trait or
complex. A striking example is Islam. At least ideally, Islamic monotheism is so strict and
encompassing that all that develops in this world is predetermined by Allah, the Supreme,
according to His gracious will. This deterministic holding prevents the Muslimic believer
from rendering judgments for which she or he can assume individual responsibility. 27 This
may be why a Parmenideian judgment “this is true”, ”this is good”, or “this is beautiful” is so
seldomly heard from a Muslim. Lacking the Parmenideian proposition, empirical-critical
investigation across time of the true, the good, and the esthetic qualification is foreign to the
pious Muslim mind as is the consequence of such investigation whenever more than one
person participates in it: the Platonic dialog. 28
Universals are not the only generalities among cultures. Carl Gustav Jung (1875 – 1961)
identified certain personal contents of the human unconscious which he called parts of the
collective psyche. They consist in archaic images and symbols – so-called archetypes – which
render reiterating experiences of mankind. Because of the similarity of human brains and their
27

Cf., W. Fikentscher, Modes of Thought (2004), 424 – 431, 438, and the authorities
compiled and discussed there.
28

On the lacking proposition of truth and its consequences, Lawrence Rosen, Bargaining for
Reality: The Construction of Social Relations in a Muslim in a Muslim Community, Chicago
& London 1984: University of Chicago Press.

working in this world these archetypes can be found in all peoples at all times. They may be
called cross-cultural unconscious universals. 29 Based on Jung’s psychological writings and on
his own theoretical studies as welll as fieldwork, Mircea Eliade (1907 – 1986) created an
elaborate work of comparative religion which focuses on magic-religious images and
symbols. Eliade found, in many cultures, similar archetypical symbols for related
cosmogenetic myths, such as the world tree and the central temple of the world, and similar
activities of getting to know them, such as shamanism. These archetypical representations are
of transsubjective and transcultural nature. 30
The natural sciences operate with the concept of natural constants, such as gravitation, masses
and structures of particles, and the speed of light. 31
Another way to cross-cultural universals can be derived from the anthropological theories of
analysis of foreign cultures.32 Starting point is componential analysis, a tool apt for
identifying concepts and their compilations in other cultures. For evaluations, the next step is
correlational analysis.33 Since both are “merely” emic, the discvovery of the other (culture)
must follow. Then, for comparing cultures, meta-concepts and meta-evaluations have to be

An example: C. G. Jung, Symbolik des Geistes: Psychologische Abhandlungen, vol. 6,
Zurich 1948.
29
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e. g., Mircea Eliade, The Two and the One, London 1965: Harvill; idem, Images and
Symbols: Studies in Religious Symbolism, Princeton 1991: Princeton U. Press (French
original: Images et symboles: Essais sur le symbolisme magico-réligieux, Paris 1952); idem,
Le chamanisme et les techniques archaiques de l’exstase, Paris 1951.
31

See, e.g., Harald Fritzsch, Das absolut Unveränderliche: Die letzten Rätsel des Physik,
Munich 2006: Piper; cf., Robert H. Lowie: “….culture cannot construct houses contrary to the
laws of gravitation”, R. H. Lowie, Culture and Ethnology, New York 1966: Basic Books (first
published 1917), 25, cited from Brown, op. cit, 63, note 5.
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For the following, see the detailed discussion, including the “Yale Ethnography”, in W.
Fikentscher, Modes of Thought, 2d ed. Tübingen 2004 (1st ed. 1995): Mohr Siebeck, 116 ff.,
esp.130 – 149.
Leopold Pospíšil, A Formal Analysis of Substantive Law: Kapauku Papuan Laws of Land
Tenure, in E. A. Hammel (ed.), Formal Semantic Analysis (1965) American Anthropologist ,
vol 67/5, part 2, 186 – 214; idem, A Formal Analysis of Substantive Law: Kapauku Laws of
Inhertitance, in: Laura Nader (ed.), The Ethnography of Law (1965) American
Anthropologist, vol 67/7, part 2, 166 – 185.
33

formed, a mental process strictly and consequentially to be separated from the forgoing emic
research (“synepeia analysis”). 34
The meta-concepts and -values represent a “new etic”, 35 which avoids to surreptitiously place
one’s own emic (“Western rationality and systematization”) as etic for the others. By the same
token, in an inductive and empirical manner, this procedure produces universals: Universals
are the meta-concepts and -values needed for studing a foreign culture while coming from
another culture. These universals are established only inasmuch they are needed for a given
study. Thus, there is no unnecessary speculation. The independence of every culture is
respected, and still cultural universals are conceivable and acceptable as invariants. For
cultural anthropology, the analytical meta-level contains the universals. Universals become
being drawn from the analyses of cultural anthropology. The differences are not all that
should be of concern to anthropology. 36
The latter concept of universals as meta-concepts and -evaluations will be used in the
subsequent investigation of property and competition as universals or cultural specificities.

2. Kinds of Universals
Universals are subdivided in different ways. Donald E. Brown uses no less than four levels of
distinction. 37 He categorizes:
a) Universals of classification have to be distinguished from universals of contents (48).
Synonymously, Brown also calls the former formal, the latter substantive (49). Universals of
34

Synepeia = Greek: consequence. The meaning of “synepeia analysis” is that three items: the
foreign culture under study, the own culture of the researcher, and the meta-level used for the
study, should each consequently be distinguished, for clearer results, but mainly in order to
avoid inserting (“smuggling”) conclusions from the meta-level into emic cultures, such as
“tribal separation of political powers”, “Marxist human rights”, “Kula market”, or “dialog
with Islam”.
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see note 26, above, at 148.
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this is the answer to Brown, p. 2 line 5.
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In this subchapter, the numbers in brackets indicate the pages in Brown’s book

classification are generated by emic or etic additions of singular items. Thus, different colors
can be summarized to the concept “color”, various kinds of weather to the category
“weather”. 38 Universals of content exist without such preceding compilations, by virtue of
their substance, such as risk, xenophobia, property, competition. 39
An excellent example of an emic universal of content may be found in Khaled Hosseini’s
book “Kite Runner”. 40 Baba teaches his son Amir: There is only one sin, one single sin. And
this is theft. All other sins are just variations of it. When you kill somebody, you steal a life,
you steal his wife her right to a husband, and his children their father. When you tell a lie, you
steal another person’s right for truth. When you cheat, you steal the right for justice……There
is no act more despicable than stealing. A man who takes what does not belong him, whether
a life or a naan-bread, on this man I spit. If ever I should meet him, then God help him. Do
you understand this? In this Afghan story, the content of property – tangible or intangible –
makes up the only universal that counts.
b) Universals of essence, such as the difference between the female and the male sex, have to
be distinguished from universals of accident, such as fire making and cooking.
c) Innate universals, such as the human ability to count, have to be distinguished from
manifest universals which are shared by some cultures but not by all, such as the nuclear
family. Gestures for approval or disapproval are universal, but their meaning can culturally
differ: Shaking the head means disapproval in the majority of cultures, but consent in Greece.
d) Finally, emic universals (as exemplified by a Pashtuni-Muslim very extensive concept of
property in Khaled Hosseini’s story of Baba and Amir) have to be distinguished from etic
universals as used by the outside researcher. 41
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my examples. Brown’s text is brief here.
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my examples. Brown mentions facial expressions of emotions and coyness.
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Khaled Hosseini, The Kite Runner, New York 2003: Riverhead, German ed. Drachenläufer,
Berlin 2004: BvT (translation Angelika Naujokat & Michael Windgassen), 24 f. (in the
German edition).
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For a criticism of the traditional distinction between emic and etis, see the text above near
notes 26 – 28. In synepeia analysis, emic universals sort under componential and correlational

These are the kinds of universals identified by Donald E. Brown, the most respected authority
on ethnological universals

Peter M. Hejl introduces another set of distinctions between universals.42 He points to a
difference between universals of biopsychic and of functional origin. Biopsychic universals
grow from evolution and thus cause homologic similarities (such as the correspondence
between a fin, a wing, and an arm). Functional universals result from parallel contacts with
the environment and lead to analogies (such as the largely identical form of a shark – a fish and a dolphin – a mammal -. Swimming in water requires the form).
Obviously, property belongs to both categories. Some insects, most birds and many mammals
defend their territory for reasons of reproduction and food resources. Reproducing societies,
especially when the reproduced items have to be stored, need property as a functional
institution. 43 In hierarchically structured groups of mammals, possession and use of chattles
may enhance status. Chimp researchers tell of toys, and tin cans by which noise can be made,
that have been used for status improvement. 44
The same as of property can be said of competition. Competition for mating partners, for food
and for shelter belongs to evolutionary routine. Once resources become scarce, there will be
functional competition for them.

3. Murdock’s List and other Lists

analysis depending on their factual or evaluative nature, etic univertsals belong to the metalevel of comparison and consequences to be drawn from comparisons.
Peter M. Hejl (ed.), Universalien und Konstruktivismus, Frankfurt am Main 2001:
Suhrkamp.
42
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Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes, Cambridge,
Mass. 1991: Harvard University Press (reprint 2005)
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Frans de Waal, Chimpanzee Politics: Power and Sex Among Apes, New York 1982: Harper
(rev. ed. Baltimore 1998: Johns Hopkins University Press.

In 1945, in context with preparatory work for the Human Relations Area Files, George Peter
Murdock (1897 – 1985) published a compilation of universals which he called “partial list”. It
became known as “Murdock’s List”. 45 Brown cites the list. 46 It contains 74 universals in
alphabetical order and mentions “property” without distinguishing between tangible and
intangible property. It does not mention competition, nor economy (but it lists “trade”).
Clark Wissler (1870 – 1947) drafted a “cultural scheme” of ethnographic themes for
providing as framework for the collection and presentation of ethnographic reports.47 This list
of classifications covers fields of ethnographic interests and is not meant as collection of
universals. Nevertheless, Brown’s interpretation of the register correctly points to its possible
use for identifying universals and their subspecies, for example, of classification and of
content. 48
Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt and Wulf Schiefenhövel who both substantially worked on
ethnological universals amended Murdock’s list by the following twenty universals:
aggression and control of agression, jealousy, genital shame, no coitus coram publico,
empathy, curses involving sex or sacredness, sex-typical roles for man and wife, mimics,
normative protection of marriage, binary or otherwise contrasting conceptualization, care for
the ill, use of medications, ethnozoology, socialization of children, shame relating to
excrements of the human body, hierarchies of rank, special funeral rites for close kin,
distinguishing one’s own group from foreign groups with regard to hair styles, clothing,
jewelry, dialect, tattoos and other arbitrary bodily changes, and having a calendar. Instead of
property, Eibl-Eibesfeldt and Schiefenhövel speak of property rights, again without
distinguishing between tangible and intangible property. Competition is not listed.

4. Tangible Property
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G. P. Murdock, The Common Denominator of Cultures, in: Ralph Linton (ed.), The Science
of Man in the World Crisis, New York 1945, Columbia U. Press, 123 – 142, at 124.
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on p. 69-70.
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Clark Wissler, Man and Culture. New York 1923: Crowell; here reprinted from D. E.
Brown (1991), 58 f.
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Brown (1991), 59.

The preliminary outcome as to the universal character of property is that having tangible
property, for instance in territories, is evolutionary advantageous, and can be found in both
animals and humans to such an extent that it is justified to speak of an ethnological universal.
By consequence, property-directed brain activities are involved. Of course, there are
variations of property in animals and in human cultures that amount to cultural specifities as
well. A foxhole is different from a depot of negotiable instruments. But the essence of
property, the assignment of a thing to a an animal or person
is universal.
Therefore it is consistent that Donald E. Brown mentions property as a universal on many
pages of his book,49 and the lists mentioned under 3. above contain property as well.

5. Intellectual Property
Intellectual property, such as patents, copyrights, trademarks, secret know-how etc. is
intangible. It is a mental construct. Continental legal doctrine also uses the expression
“immaterial goods”. Ethnological literature on universals does not expressly refer to
intellectual property. Since it is not excluded from property, and the distinction between
tahgible and intangible property is well known beyond the limits of the law, it may be
assumed that the universal called “property” also includes intellectual property.
But is there intellectual property in the animal world from where a universal concept of
intellectual property could have developed into the traditions of humanity? Are intellectual
property rights evolutionary building blocks for human culture? Cheating among animals is a
well documented behavior, for example when blackbirds pretent limping in order to distract
raptors away from the nest, or when foxes wipe out their foot traces that lead to their den.
If adaptive cheating includes having secrets and being induced to hide them, there is
intangible property in knowing something that is protected. Squirrels hide collected hazel nuts
and sometimes even find them again in the winter. When they keep their cache secret, they
48 (property relations), 69 (in Murdock’s list), 130 – 1323, 174 (in a comment to A. Irving
Hallowell), 182 (concept of property, in a comment to R. Linton)196 (in a comment to L.
Tiger and R. Fox).
49

own intellectual property. But do they rent out their knowledge to colleagues, in a kind of
licensing agreement, in return for a favor? I never observed this, and it is unlikely that
squirrels do engage in this kind of advanced capitalism. Bees are reported to tell their sisters
from the same hive, not to bees from other hives, when a linden tree starts blossoming at some
distance. Has anyone observed bees telling their discovery to foreign bees for a quid pro quo?
Among humans, knowing something, esp. knowing how to do something, is in pre-industrial
and industrial societies often regarded as a value. The value may be regarded positively, such
as the ability of a good tracker to lead the hunt, or negatively, such as in the pueblos of New
Mexico and Arizona where traditionally knowing something raises the suspicion of being a
witch. 50 Australian aborigines withheld their knowledge of waterholes (billabongs) in the
northwestern central part of Australia from the whites for many years. Water was the most
precious thing and so had to be the knowledge of access to that water. 51At any rate,
knowledge is protectable.
The delineation between tangible and intangible property is imprecise. Often it is not clear
whether a piece of property belongs to the one or to the
The delineation betweem tangible and intangible property is imprecise.
Often it is not clear whether a piece of property belongs to the one or
other category. The story of Baba and his son Amir mixes chattels and mental values as
objects of theft. 52 Many cultures know the theft of honor, or of the “face” that can get “lost”
or “stolen”. The territory, in the Western conception is an area attributable to a person or
persons and can therefore be tangible property of those to whom it is assigned.
But what about the intangible access to territory, for example to land good for hunting in
winter time? Some Northamerican tribes such as the Southern Paiute, used to migrate from
the mountains to the prairie in the fall, and back to the mountains in spring. Migration took
place on traditional trails. Are these trails and the know-how to follow them tangible or
50

A probable reason for this is the danger of competition to the tribal upper class. Die
Gedanken sind frei (thoughts are free) is no pueblo tradition. But works of art are freely
copied from pueblo to pueblo. We see the reverse of the Western system.
Bayerischer Rundfunk “Bayern 5” in a report on Australian aborigines on August 2, 2006, 9
p.m.
51

52

See text near 39, above

intangible property? More the second than the first. 53 And when a homesteader put up a fence
that crossed that trail und demanded from the migrating Paiute to respect that fence and not to
trespass on his land – what was violated by the homesteader: tangible or intangible property?
When Taos Pueblo, New Mexico, won back Blue Lake after a lengthy trial involving Indian
tribal and Federal Indian law, it did not only win back the lake and the forest around it as a
piece of land or landscape, but as constituent part of tribal idenity as intangible property.
Thus, the limits between tangibility and intellect are fluent.
From all this it follows that the ethnological universal called “property” should include
intellectual property. The particular concrete legal and economic shape of the goods to be
protected under the shelter of the concept of property must be left to the different thoughtmodal or cultural 54 circumstances. 55 This is the world of cultural specificities. Examples are

Zoology knows both: A male singing bird marks his territory by his songs, a marten marks
his trail: “Watch out, this is my way”.
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On the difference between the (culture forming) modes of thought and the (modes-ofthought determined) cultures, W. Fikentscher, Modes of Thought, 99.
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There are three alternative ways of approaching this concrete shape: (1) Western concepts
of the protection of intellectual property, extant in national legislation and in an international
treaty system that dates back to the Berne Conventions of 1883 and 1886, are being subjected
to an – etical - examination to which extent they can be mobilized and used for the protection
of intellectual property in non-industrial societies; (2) for the protection of intellectual
property in non-industrial societies, emical studies in these societies are to be started and
condensed to a sui-generis-right protection first on the international, later on the national
level; (3) local courts in local jurisdictions, for example of non-industrial societies, decide
according to local law of property and torts (including of unfair trading) against offenders,
and execution in the home countries of the offenders is provided under the rules of
international procedural law. See W. Fikentscher, Geistiges Gemeineigentum – am Beispiel
der Afrikanischen Philosophie, in : Ansgar Ohly et al. (eds.), Perspektiven Geistigen
Eigentums und Wettbewerbsrechts, Festschrift Gerhard Schricker on his 70th birthday,
Munich 2005: C. H. Beck, 3 – 18, where materials to approaches no. (1) and no. (2) are
collected and discussed, and approach no. (3) is theoretically developed and politically
proposed. Since approach no (3) covers, besides the law of intellectual property, the law of
unfair trade practices, there is no reason why approach no. 3 should not include local laws
against restraints of competition, and local decisions applying it, too; see the following
subsection on competition. On such legal practices observed in the field: Robert D. Cooter &
W. Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: The Role of Custom in American Indian Tribal Courts,
Part I, 46 American Journal of Comparative Law 287-330 (1998); idem, Indian Common
Law: The Role of Custom in American Indian Tribal Courts, Part II, 46 American Journal of
Comparative Law 509–580 (1998); idem, American Indian Law Codes: Pragmatic Law and
Tribal Identity, in preparation for American Journal of Comparative Law (2007).

the forms of copyright, moral rights to a ceremonial dance, rights in a traditional song,
pilgrimages to a shrine, the yearly Hopi salt expedition.

6. Competition
Franz Böhm (1895 – 1977), one of the fathers of the German antitrust law (that went into
force in 1958) once said that competition has no lobby. It may be added that competition has
not much social-science theory either. The human freedom to economically act, for example
in production and trade, is used as an inexhaustible resource as a matter of course. When this
kind of economic acting meets scarce supply, rivalry occurs and competition results. Thus,
competition is economic acting under certain conditions, but it shares economic acting’s fate.
Competition is the reverse side of the coin called property.
The question to be asked should therefore rather be whether economic acting is a universal.
However, because of the context just established, it is also permitted to ask whether
competition is a universal. One must only keep in mind that competition is a form of
economic acting under certain requirements, and similarly, competition itself is a
phenomenon that may take different forms under different requirements. These requirements
cannot be studied and discussed here in detail. It is obvious that in a hunters and gatherers’
society such as that of Northamericam Indian runners who run for ceremonial reasons perform
a kind of competition different from the competition among the members of a modern rifle
association and of the competition between modern chain stores and mom-and-pop shops.
Among the Indians, competition is one-dimensional and aspective (who is ahead of the
others?), the rifle owners’ competition is both competitor- and association-bound (who is the
best of the club?) and thus perspective,
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and the rivalry between chain stores and small

business concerns competition between channels of distribution on another (perspective)
macroeconomic level.
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W. Fikentscher, Modes of Thought (2004), 254 f.

It should be noted that competition in the sense used in the above text is competition defined
by rivalry. Therefore it is not perfect competition in the neoclassic sense which for
informational requirements is defined by the absence of rivalry. For the same reason rivalrous
competition does not take place on a perfect market. 57 Rivalry involves a subjective (=
individual) market. Among other consequences, this means that from a neoclassical point of
view competition cannot be identified as an ethnological universal. In turn, this confirms the
foregoing decision for the substantivist and against the formalist approach. 58 That perfect
competition is no competition forces a decision in favor of the subjective (=individual)
market, because only non-perfect markets know rivalry. At least at this point, ethnology has to
say farewell to neoclassical economics. 59
The fact that the word and concept of (rivalry-defined) competition is being used in the
foregoing comparisons justifies, under the test developed before, 60 to speak of competition as
a universal.
7. Reasons for Positing Generalities and Invariants as Universals. Postmodernism
The reason why tangible and intellection property as well as competition have been
ascertained as ethnological universals is the necessity to have tertia comparationis for
comparing various situations in different ethnic groups, situations in which tangible and
intangible things are assigned to persons or groups of persons in an exclusionary manner, or
in which such assignments move from person to person, group to group, person to group, or
group to person.61 It makes no diference whether these points of comparison are called
archetypes, constants, or meta-concepts and -values.
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For details, W. Fikentscher, Culture, Law and Economics (2004),107 ff.
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See II. 1., above.
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See the discussion II. 6., above
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See III., above.
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This is the gist of the substantivist perspective put forward under II., above.

This result contradicts postmodern holdings. Postmodernism rejects general concepts and
values. 62 In this, philosophical postmodernism is a flashback to nominalism. 63 As in
philosophical nominalism, an ideological undergound criticism of alleged values seems to
foment postmodernist fervor. There is a connection between evaluation and generalization, at
least a psychological one, and both evaluation and generalization are aspects of the
universalia issue.
Authors who feel uneasy in front of values, tend to attack generalizations because the antigeneralization argument is less biting, less risky. It is no secret that a considerable number of
postmodernist writers, for example in France, were in earlier years to be found in the Marxist
camp. After 1989, they turned postmodern. A value system had broken up, so all or other
values were put to doubt, so why not start with the tiny and small again, and fight
generalizations, including universals? If I do not like the contents, let me argue
methodologically. Hence, speaking in favor of universals, will draw postmodernist critique.

IV. Purposes of Protection and Fund Theory
To accept ethnological universals, for instance property and competition is only a more or less
conceptional, and thus formal step. The much deeper going issues arise when one asks for the
purposes to which the conceived universals are to be used, for example in economics, or in
law.
1. What is to be protected?
Concepts, including universals, are only meaningful when something depends on their
proposition. In law, we ask for the consequences a concept may be used for. Property is a
legal concept ordinarily used to protect someone or something. This side of the universals
problem cannot be discussed in extenso in this paper. Reference may be made to another

See, e.g., the reply to Sally Falk Moore in: W. Fikentscher, Ein juristisches Jahrhundert,
Rechtshistorisches Journal 19 (2000), 560 - 567
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See text before note 17, above.

publication that tries to draft a system of protectable interests (Schutzgüter) in the ethnology
of intellectual property protection. 64
There are three main reasons for the protection of intellectual property rights in pre-industrial
societies: (1) to protect holders of traditional knowledge and similar items assignable to
persons or groups of persons from theft, intrusion and other forms of disrespect (“taboozone”, protected by the principle injunctive relief in general and for violations of droit moral
in particular), such as secret tales, music, or dances; (2) to protect such holders against
financial exploitation of these goods, through misrepresentations or misappropriations, by
having the offender pay damages (“damages zone” protected by the principle that one should
not reap where one has not sown); and (3) to provide for compensation (for example fictive
licensing fees) in cases of “paid fair use”, “paying public domain” or “non-injunction torts” 65
(“paying public domain zone” protected by the principle of “takings” according to which
there are limitations to tangible and intangible property that ought to be tolerated, but
compensated). All three “zones” of protection of (tangible and) intangible property own their
reason of protection to the idea that someone who contributed an achievement to the common
stock of human havings ought to be rewarded for that contribution. To make such desirable
contributions possible at all, the law of competition provides for the necessary flexibility,
without which all ownership would not change anymore from one holder to another.
Therefore competition must be free and fair. Competition law provides for a number of
equitable remedies, all flowing from the underlying idea that earnings from restraints of
competition and from unfair advantages deserve no reward but hamper those contributions.
In order to create consistent sanctions against such inequitable advantages, empirically to be
derived and subjected to legal-political control, it is necessary to have generalized, invariant
concepts, that is, tangible and intellectual property, and competition. The empirical-deductive
development of the idea of universals on the basis of Synepeia analysis proves its worth (see
III. 1.), above)..

W. Fikentscher & Thomas Ramsauer, Traditionswissen – Tummelplatz
immaterialgüterrechtlicher Prinzipien, in: Peter Ganea et al. (eds)., Urheberrecht: Gestern –
Heute – Morgen, Festschrift für Adolf Dietz, Munich 2001: C. H. Beck, 25 – 42.
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On the difficult English terminology of these permitted uses, which nevertheless are subject
to compensation, Fikentscher & Ramsauer, see preceding note, p. 37 note 22.

2. Fund Theory
Why do human beings engage in activities that, at least in hindsight, are to be labeled to be
economic? Carl Phillip Kottak developed a “fund theory” in order to distinguish the reasons
why people do what as an observable phenomenon of life is called“economy”: 66 There are
five “funds” into which humans put their economically important achievements: (1) the
“subsistence fund” is that kind of economy where performances go into nothing more than
mere self-support. (2) “Replacement” combines self-support with a storage that after using
some of it will be filled up again. (3) The “social fund” uses contributions to a common
goal such as kiva or menstruation hut. (4) Similarly, the “ceremonial fund” collects
contributions for the maintenance of a shrine or temple. (5) Only the “rent fund” knows a
produce that numerically exceeds an input. Now savings can be used for rent-seeking.
Lending and leasing out for interest follow from the possibility of having savings. Taxes
become conceivable.
Kottak ascribes subsistance, replacement, social and ceremonial fund economizing to bands
and tribes, rent fund economizing to states. This may be true for many societies, but taxes
may also occur in proto-state kingdoms, and savings are possible in bands and tribes.
Whatever the correlations may be, only the “rent fund” is able to acknowledge damages and
paid fair use, while all funds, also the subsistence, replacement, social, and ceremonial funds
will acknowledge a “taboo-zone”. Having an economy without rent-seekers, let alone utilitymaximizers, offers no reason to deny injunctions in cases of disrespect of traditional values.
Whether Kottak defined the “funds” in a convincing way, and whether the funds have to be
correlated to reasons for protecting property and competition in the above proposed or in a
different manner, finally whether there more than one profit-enabling “fund”, are issues going
beyond the object of this paper. What is important to note is that indeed the purposes of
economic behavior relate to quite different economic “fund’s” in Kottak’s sense. No formalist
author (an author who understands economic ethnology as an application of neoclassic
economic theory mutatis mutandis, see I., above) has, to my knowledge, ever paid attention to
different “funds”, however they may be characterized and arranged with one another. The
undeniable existence of the “funds”, the reasons for engaging in economic activity, disturb the
clarity of concepts neoclassics may duly claim. Formalists merely know what Kottak calls the
66
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“rent fund”. Only substantivists can – based on empirical judgment – inductively
acknowledge the existence of other funds.This is a further reason why the decision in favor of
substantivism (see II., above) is the correct and the only theoretically promising one.

V. Conclusions
1. Economic ethnology is a subfield of ethnology as an empirical social science.
2. Ethnoeconomics is not accessible by deduction from neoclassic economic
models because of their prescriptive character and because of theoretical
requirements such as perfect competition, objective (instead of individual)
market, marginal cost, utility maximizing and property rights.
3. In economic ethnology, two determinisms run counter each other, the
postulative model determinism of neoclassics, and the empiricism-based
cultural determinism (insofar it is admissible). There is no bridge.
4. Universals are to be discussed from a substantivist, not formalist, perspective.
This implies a rejection of neoclassic economics at least as far as universals are
concerned. Moreover, for a large number of modern microeconomic and
politico-economic ends, national and global, neoclassic economics should be
given up altogether. An Empirical Economic Theory is needed instead. Part of
it, and proof for it, is the empirical universalism proposed in this article.
5. The anthropological-analytical apparatus (componential, correlational
analyses, synepeia analysis) can easily be used for the identification of
universals and specificities. Universals are what in these analyses count as
meta-concepts and meta-values. They need not be “deep in our brain”, they
result from comparison of cultures.
6. Under these standards, tangible property, intellectual property, and competition
are ethnological universals. Thought-modal and cultural specificities,
qualifying these universals, are present, and to be expected. Sometimes, a

specific culture carves out exceptions from a universal trait or complex,
sometimes even a certain modes of thought – behind a group of cultures –
carves out traits or complexes. Islam is an example where a mode of thought
causes specifications for the universal human activity of rendering
(Parmenideian) judgments.
7. Local courts are entitled to decide under local law, thus adding sanctions to
breaches of the laws protecting property and competition. Executions of such
local decisions in other jurisdictions require the absence of public policy
defenses. Universals will often serve as reasons for such absence.
8. The purposes of protecting intellectual property and competition have to be
correlated to the universals and an anthropological fund theory. Then they may
result in adequate economic and legal sanctions against offenses. For example,
injunctive relief against violations of traditional knowledge, which is taboo to
outsiders, is an appropriate sanction in the subsistence, replacement,
ceremonial, social, and rent fund. Damages and paying public domain (“paid
fair use”, “non-injunction torts”) make only sense in the rent fund. Damages
prevent reaping where one has not sown, paying public domain remedies
prevent theft by good people, under the principle of takings (“endure but
liquidate”).
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